antigravity-workflows
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions and command templates for the agent to download and execute an external package named
agentic-awesome-skillsfrom the public npm registry. This behavior allows for the execution of unverified binaries on the host system, which could perform arbitrary actions outside the skill's own source code.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic depends on the agent executing shell commands for package installation and running the installer tool in both 'dry-run' and active modes.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is configured to ingest instructions from project-level files such asdocs/users/workflows.mdanddata/workflows.json. If these files contain malicious payloads, the agent could be manipulated into performing unintended actions during the workflow execution. - Ingestion points:
docs/users/workflows.mdanddata/workflows.jsonwithin the local environment. - Boundary markers: None specified; instructions are treated as a 'Source of Truth'.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (
npm exec), file system access, and invocation of other skills. - Sanitization: No methods for sanitizing or validating the content of these external workflow files are provided.- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's frontmatter includes a
risk: nonefield. This is a deceptive claim that minimizes the significant risks associated with the dynamic execution of external code and the processing of untrusted input.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers network requests to the npm registry (registry.npmjs.org) to fetch and run the installer utility during the setup phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata