claude-code-expert

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation recommends the use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This flag disables critical human-in-the-loop safety checks, allowing the AI agent to execute potentially destructive shell commands or system modifications without user confirmation.
  • [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill utilizes Claude Code's hooks feature to automatically execute shell commands or scripts during lifecycle events (e.g., Stop, PostToolUse). This creates a mechanism for persistent, automated command execution whenever the CLI tool is active.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external dependencies and scripts, such as a secret_scanner.py located in a hardcoded local directory (C:/Users/renat/skills/cred-omega/scripts/) and custom Node.js MCP servers, which are not provided in the skill package and constitute unverified external code.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing project data with high-privilege tools. Ingestion points: Reads CLAUDE.md, project source files, and git output. Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the project data. Capability inventory: Full Bash shell access, filesystem Read and Write capabilities, and the ability to spawn sub-agents. Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content is described.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The risk: none claim in the metadata is deceptive given the encouragement to bypass security permissions and the implementation of automated persistence hooks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 13, 2026, 09:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-code-expert