claude-code-expert
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation recommends the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag disables critical human-in-the-loop safety checks, allowing the AI agent to execute potentially destructive shell commands or system modifications without user confirmation. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill utilizes Claude Code's
hooksfeature to automatically execute shell commands or scripts during lifecycle events (e.g.,Stop,PostToolUse). This creates a mechanism for persistent, automated command execution whenever the CLI tool is active. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external dependencies and scripts, such as a
secret_scanner.pylocated in a hardcoded local directory (C:/Users/renat/skills/cred-omega/scripts/) and custom Node.js MCP servers, which are not provided in the skill package and constitute unverified external code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing project data with high-privilege tools. Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.md, project source files, and git output. Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the project data. Capability inventory: FullBashshell access, filesystemReadandWritecapabilities, and the ability to spawn sub-agents. Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content is described. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
risk: noneclaim in the metadata is deceptive given the encouragement to bypass security permissions and the implementation of automated persistence hooks.
Audit Metadata