distributed-debugging-debug-trace
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
remote-debug-server.jsfile inresources/implementation-playbook.mdimplements a WebSocket server that accepts arbitrary expressions and executes them within the process usinginspector.Session().post('Runtime.evaluate', { expression, ... }). This creates a direct remote code execution (RCE) vector if the service is reachable over the network. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Multiple patterns in
resources/implementation-playbook.mdlead to the exposure of highly sensitive information: - The
TracingSystemintracing.jsspecifically configures instrumentations to capturehttp.request.bodyandsession.idinto spans, which are then exported to a remote Jaeger endpoint. - The
DebugMiddlewareFactoryexposes a manual web route/debug/heapthat triggers a heap snapshot. Memory heap snapshots contain environment variables, encryption keys, and raw user data. - The
ProductionDebuggercaptures all console logs and returns them to the caller via HTTP headers (X-Debug-Info), creating a data leak path. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Docker configuration provided in the playbook sets
NODE_OPTIONS="--inspect=0.0.0.0:9229". Binding the Node.js inspector to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) without authentication is a high-risk configuration that allows remote attackers to attach a debugger and execute arbitrary code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied requirements via
$ARGUMENTSand generates complex diagnostic configurations based on them. - Ingestion points: Ingests requirements in
SKILL.mdto drive the configuration of tracing and debugging workflows. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not explicitly warn the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the user's requirements.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates code capable of file system writes (
v8-profiler-next), network operations (JaegerExporter,ElasticsearchTransport), and dynamic code execution (inspector.Session). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the inputs used to build the debug dashboard or tracing attributes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata