agent-skill-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The tool's installation instructions recommend piping a remote shell script from the author's GitHub repository directly into a shell interpreter (
curl | shandirm | iex). This pattern executes remote code without local verification of the script content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation runner (
scripts/run_evals_template.py) and various scripts within the skill's lifecycle execute arbitrary shell commands defined in JSON evaluation specifications usingsubprocess.runwithshell=True. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution patterns for validation and file generation. Specifically,
scripts/check_pipeline.pyuses the Pythoncompile()function to check the syntax of generated scripts, andscripts/render_installers.pydynamically creates installer scripts by performing string replacements on templates and modifying file permissions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a factory that ingests untrusted data from documents, emails, and transcripts to automatically derive intent and generate new skill code and instructions. While it includes a security scanner for the skills it produces, the ingestion process itself is an attack surface.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Scripts such as
scripts/dependency_health.pyandscripts/schema_drift.pyuseurllib.request.urlopento perform network requests to external URLs for monitoring. The judge harness also makes outbound calls to the Anthropic API.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/FrancyJGLisboa/agent-skill-creator/main/scripts/bootstrap.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata