sift
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script
scripts/tickets.shto perform issue tracking operations. This script invokes theghCLI for GitHub interactions and executes a static, embedded Python script to interface with Linear and Jira APIs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from issue bodies, comments, and pull request diffs which are controlled by external users.
- Ingestion points: Issue data is gathered via
gh issue viewand theissue(Linear) orview(Jira) API calls within thescripts/tickets.shutility. - Boundary markers: While the skill applies a disclaimer to its own generated comments, it lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore" instructions when interpolating retrieved issue content into its reasoning context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify issue metadata (labels), post comments as the authenticated user, and close tickets.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the external issue content is performed before the agent analyzes it to recommend triage states, creating a potential vector for malicious issue descriptions to influence agent actions.
- [CREDENTIALS_SAFE]: Sensitive information such as
LINEAR_API_KEYandJIRA_API_TOKENis handled through environment variables. The skill explicitly instructs the agent to never hardcode or write credentials to files, adhering to security best practices for secret management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to well-known and trusted services including
api.linear.appand user-defined Jira Cloud instances (JIRA_BASE_URL). These connections are required for the skill's core functionality and are established using TLS via enforcedhttpsprotocols.
Audit Metadata