agentic-jujutsu
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's Quick Start section directs users to run
npx agentic-jujutsu. This command fetches and executes code from the public NPM registry. The package is not associated with a recognized trusted organization or the provided vendor infrastructure. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple implementation examples, such as the
SelfImprovingAgentclass and theadaptiveDeploymentfunction, demonstrate a pattern where the skill retrievesrecommendedOperationsfrom an AI-powered suggestion engine (jj.getSuggestion) and executes them in a loop. This behavior allows dynamically generated strings to control shell execution without clear constraints. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data can influence agent actions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
jj.getSuggestion(taskDescription)andjj.finalizeTrajectory(score, critique)inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided in the documentation to prevent the AI from following malicious instructions embedded in the task descriptions or critiques.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
jj.execute()to run shell commands, providing a high-impact capability that can be manipulated by malicious input. - Sanitization: The provided code snippets do not show any validation, sanitization, or human-in-the-loop verification of the operations before they are executed.
Audit Metadata