Oracle ADK Expert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's code examples demonstrate accessing sensitive credential files located at
~/.oci/config. Accessing system-level configuration and credential stores is a sensitive operation that exposes environment metadata and authentication secrets to the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an environment where indirect prompt injection is possible. It instructs the agent on how to build applications that ingest untrusted user input (e.g., via the
chat_endpointoruser_queryvariables) and pass that data to LLM agents which have access to enterprise tools such asSQLToolandFunctionTool. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
user_queryparameter in orchestration logic,user_inputin workflows, and themessagefield in the FastAPI and Slack integrations (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The provided implementation examples lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear text separators) or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user-provided data.
- Capability inventory: The agents described in the skill are granted capabilities to perform database operations via
SQLTool, interact with CRM systems throughFunctionTool, and invoke other specialized agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or filtering logic in the code snippets to prevent malicious instructions hidden in user data from being executed by the LLM.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references official documentation and resources from
oraclecloud.comandoracle.com. These are recognized as well-known service domains and the references are documented here neutrally as safe project resources.
Audit Metadata