skill-comply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses an LLM to generate 'setup_commands' for test scenarios, which are then executed via
subprocess.runinscripts/runner.py. Because the commands are generated based on the content of external skill files, a malicious file could influence the LLM to output harmful shell commands which the skill would execute without validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically constructs and executes shell commands using
subprocess.runin several scripts (runner.py,classifier.py,scenario_generator.py,spec_generator.py) to interface with theclaudeCLI and manage sandboxed environments. This broad use of subprocess execution increases the overall attack surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external Markdown files to derive behavioral specifications and test scenarios, creating a significant injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User-provided skill or rule file path processed in
scripts/run.pyand subsequently read inscripts/spec_generator.pyandscripts/scenario_generator.py. - Boundary markers: Prompts use triple-dash (
---) separators around ingested content but lack explicit instructions for the LLM to ignore potentially malicious directions within that content. - Capability inventory: Ability to execute arbitrary shell commands via
subprocess.runand invoke theclaudeCLI with generated prompts. - Sanitization: Implements path sanitization in
_safe_sandbox_dirto restrict file operations to a temporary directory, but lacks content sanitization for the generated commands and prompts produced by the LLM.
Audit Metadata