fix-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, specifically GitHub issue reports and local markdown files.
- Ingestion points: The
ARGUMENTvariable inSKILL.md(Step 1) allows the agent to fetch content usinggh issue viewor direct file reads. - Boundary markers: The skill attempts to implement a logical boundary by using a separate
general-purposesubagent to extract facts and explicitly forbidding the main agent from reading the raw source. However, there are no structural delimiters or escaping mechanisms to prevent a malicious report from influencing the subagent's output. - Capability inventory: The skill can write to the filesystem, execute shell commands (tests and
pre-commit), and spawn additional agents. - Sanitization: There is a list of exclusions (suspected causes, PR links, etc.) provided to the subagent to act as a manual filter, though this does not programmatically sanitize the input against sophisticated injections hidden in verbatim "Reproduction" or "Evidence" blocks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several command-line tools to perform its tasks.
- Evidence: Execution of
gh issue viewto retrieve external data,git diffto view changes, andpre-commit run --files <changed files>which executes project-specific hooks. These hooks typically run arbitrary code (linters, formatters) defined within the repository's environment.
Audit Metadata