tooluniverse-clinical-trial-design
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.30). In
python_implementation.pythe runtime ingests outsider-authored free text directly as the user-suppliedindicationanddrug_namearguments, then passes them into tool searches (e.g.,PubMed_search_articles,OpenTargets_get_disease_id_description_by_name,search_clinical_trials) where the tool results become LLM input for report generation.
HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
- Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned all files for literal, high-entropy credentials. I flagged the Slack shared_invite token because it is a long, random-looking value embedded in a join URL that can grant access to the project's Slack workspace — this meets the definition of a high-entropy literal that provides access to a service.
I ignored obvious placeholders and low-security setup values:
- .env.template entries like BIOGRID_API_KEY=your_api_key_here, BRENDA_PASSWORD=your_api_key_here, export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-..." in README, and other "your_api_key_here" or "sk-..." placeholders are documentation placeholders and explicitly listed as things to ignore.
- No private keys, bearer tokens, or other API secrets (beyond the Slack invite token) were present.
Files/lines ignored as placeholders: .env.template (all lines), README.md lines showing export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-..." (placeholder), and other example keys in documentation.
Issues (2)
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W008
HIGHSecret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
Audit Metadata