code-snippet-images
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided code snippets and titles by interpolating them directly into HTML templates for image rendering.
- Ingestion points: Content from user requests is placed into
<!-- CODE CONTENT -->and<!-- FILENAME -->placeholders withinassets/template.htmlandassets/grid-2x2.html. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore or escape instructions embedded within the user-provided code.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes a shell script that runs
google-chromein headless mode to render the HTML, which is loaded via thefile://protocol. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for HTML/JavaScript tags in the ingested code, which could allow a malicious snippet to execute scripts or attempt to access local files during the rendering process.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and processes dynamic content by creating temporary HTML files from templates and executing a browser-based rendering pipeline.
- Evidence: The workflow described in
SKILL.mdinvolves programmatically modifying HTML templates and then invokingscripts/render.shto process them. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands through a shell script to perform image rendering.
- Evidence:
scripts/render.shexecutesgoogle-chrome --headlesswith the--no-sandboxflag, and usesidentifyorfileto verify the output PNG metadata. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's HTML templates reference official font resources from a well-known service.
- Evidence: Both
assets/template.htmlandassets/grid-2x2.htmluse CSS@importrules to fetch the 'JetBrains Mono' font family from Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com).
Audit Metadata