pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a variety of shell commands using
gitandgh(GitHub CLI) to manage pull request checkouts, fetch diffs, and interact with the GitHub API. It also invokes external review tools such ascodexandgemini. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (pull request code, descriptions, and comments) and passes this data to specialized subagents for analysis. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a PR could attempt to influence the reviewer's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted PR content is ingested via
gh pr view,gh pr diff, andgh apicalls inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of strict delimiters or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing retrieved content to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell command execution, file system access (within the worktree), subagent spawning via the
Agenttool, and the ability to post comments back to GitHub. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved PR content is mentioned before it is interpolated into subagent prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and invokes external review models/tools like
codex reviewandgemini-cli-review. These tools interact with well-known external AI services to provide additional review perspectives. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically spawns specialized subagents (e.g.,
freenet:skeptical-reviewer,freenet:big-picture-reviewer) based on a risk-tier assessment of the PR. This is a form of dynamic orchestration where the execution path depends on the data being processed.
Audit Metadata