blender-web-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides scripts and patterns for batch processing files that ingest untrusted data (filenames and directory paths) from the execution environment, which could be exploited to influence agent behavior if processed in malicious directories.
- Ingestion points:
batch_export.pyand the bash script inSKILL.mdingest file paths via CLI arguments (argv) and shell globbing. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded content within filenames or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system read/write capabilities via the
bpy(Blender Python API) andosmodules, specifically creating directories and writing.glbfiles. - Sanitization: The bash snippet in
SKILL.mdutilizes variable quoting ("$blend_file") to prevent simple command injection, but lacks broader validation of the input source integrity. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic script generation to facilitate Blender automation from the command line.
- Evidence: The automation example in
SKILL.md(section 7) uses a bash here-doc to dynamically generate Python code and pipe it into the Blender executable (`blender --python - <<EOF`). While this is a standard developer pattern for the task, it constitutes runtime code generation.
Audit Metadata