remotion-best-practices
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: Detected a zero-width character (U+2060 Word Joiner) embedded within a string literal in the file
rules/maps.md. This character is positioned immediately before the 'mapbox' protocol in the string"mapbox://styles/mapbox/standard". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits vulnerability surfaces for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
fetch()calls for external JSON files (e.g., Lottie animations inrules/lottie.md, metadata inrules/calculate-metadata.md) and by parsing user-provided.srtsubtitle files inrules/import-srt-captions.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes potentially dangerous capabilities including shell command execution via
remotion ffmpegand Node.jsexecSync(referenced inrules/transcribe-captions.md), along with network operations (fetch) and file system writes (rules/voiceover.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content retrieved from external URLs or files before it is processed by the agent or rendered in the composition.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata