requirements
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external Feishu (Lark) documents, creating a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Content fetched from user-provided URLs using the
lark-cli docs +fetch --doccommand in the '了解需求' (Understand Requirements) step. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not define delimiters or provide specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the fetched document content.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
lark-cli, file system write access (writing to/docs/prd-sumerize.mdand/prototype/), and the ability to invoke other skills like/figma-prototype. - Sanitization: Absent. The fetched content is summarized and integrated directly into the agent's context and technical solution documents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external CLI tools and other skills to fulfill its logic.
- Evidence: Execution of the
lark-cli docs +fetch --doccommand which interacts with the network to retrieve document data. - Evidence: Calls to the
/figma-prototypeskill which generates local files and prototype assets based on user-provided Figma links.
Audit Metadata