baoyu-cover-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted article content and user-supplied titles which are interpolated directly into the
prompts/cover.mdfile used by image generation backends. This creates a surface where a malicious article could attempt to influence the image generator's output or bypass its safety filters through embedded instructions. - Ingestion points: Article source content (saved to
source.md) and user-provided title/subtitle inputs interpolated into Step 3's prompt template. - Boundary markers: The prompt template uses structured headers (e.g.,
# Content Context), but does not include explicit instructions to the rendering model to ignore instructions embedded within the article text. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the filesystem and execute shell commands to trigger image generation.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is described for the article content before it is placed into the generation prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically resolves the location of a wrapper script (
codex-imagegen) at runtime by inspecting the$BAOYU_CODEX_IMAGEGEN_BINenvironment variable or searching sibling directories (e.g.,packages/baoyu-codex-imagegen/src/main.ts). The resolved path is then executed usingbunornpx. While these are internal vendor tools, the use of runtime-computed paths for execution is a noted dynamic behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To perform its primary function, the skill executes external CLI tools and scripts including
baoyu-image-gen,codex-cli, andbun. These tools are used to interface with local or remote image generation services. The instructions also suggest usingnpx -y bunas a fallback, which may involve fetching thebunpackage from the npm registry if not present locally.
Audit Metadata