baoyu-infographic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements logic in
references/codex-imagegen.mdto dynamically locate a TypeScript wrapper (main.ts) at runtime by traversing parent directories or checking environment variables. This script is then executed to facilitate image generation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes system commands, specificallybunandnpx -y bun, to run scripts located in sibling packages within the tool's directory structure. This is used as a fallback mechanism for image generation backends.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content fromsource.mdand interpolates it into an image generation prompt template (references/base-prompt.md). While it includes a policy to strip credentials, the prompt construction lacks robust boundary markers to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the user-provided data.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided source content is stored in
source.mdand used to build thestructured-content.mdfile.\n - Boundary markers: The
references/base-prompt.mduses simple markdown headers and triple-dash separators but does not include explicit instructions for the AI to ignore instructions embedded in the interpolated content.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has access to multiple image generation tools (Codex
imagegen, CursorGenerateImage, and external CLI tools).\n - Sanitization: The skill contains a specific rule to remove credentials, API keys, and secrets from the output data before prompt generation.
Audit Metadata