baoyu-post-to-wechat
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime generation and execution of Swift source code on macOS systems within
scripts/copy-to-clipboard.tsandscripts/check-permissions.ts. It writes these scripts to temporary files and executes them via theswiftcommand to interact with the nativeNSPasteboardfor rich text and image data processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of platform-specific CLI tools to automate browser interactions and network tunneling. This includes
osascript(macOS) for UI automation,xdotoolorydotool(Linux) andpowershell.exe(Windows) for keystroke simulation, and thesshcommand to establish SOCKS5 proxies for the 'Remote API' publishing method. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/wechat-image-loader.tsis capable of fetching image assets from arbitrary remote HTTP/HTTPS URLs provided by the user or within file metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and renders external Markdown and HTML files provided as input. While the output is formatted for WeChat, the processing of untrusted content alongside the skill's broad system capabilities (such as network tunneling, UI control, and local file access) presents a potential indirect prompt injection surface.
Audit Metadata