designcraft-cli-document
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a native CLI binary from GitHub releases (
github.com/storytold/designcraft) during the first run. This is a legitimate dependency for the skill's primary function. - The
bootstrap.pyscript implements high-security download practices, including hardcoded SHA256 hash verification for both the zip archive and the extracted binary. - It performs strict path validation during zip extraction to prevent directory traversal (ZipSlip) attacks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the downloaded native binary using the
subprocessmodule. - Arguments are passed as a list (
argv) rather than a shell string, mitigating shell injection risks. - Execution is limited to a predefined allowlist of subcommands (e.g.,
run,describe,version). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes external DesignCraft project files.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/command_gateway.pyreads project data via the native CLI'sdocument.inspectcommand. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters instructed for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within project metadata or text objects.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute native commands and write files (
file.saveAs) through the CLI wrapper. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates risks through strict JSON schema validation of all command parameters and structural checks of the execution plan before any native call is made.
Audit Metadata