designcraft-print-preflight
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local Python utility script (
scripts/write_script.py) to resolve command templates and subsequently run thedesigncraft-clibinary to perform document modifications. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration (
references/craft-command-evidence.json) references an external portable ZIP archive hosted on GitHub (github.com/storytold/designcraft) which contains the primary CLI tool used by the skill. Additionally, the instructions suggest installing a related skill via thenpx skills addcommand. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from design documents and interpolating that data into file-system and layout modification commands.
- Ingestion points: Document metadata, including asset IDs, text content, and layout boundaries, is extracted from user-provided files using the
document.inspect,links.list, andfont.listcommands as defined inreferences/craft-steps.json. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the design document fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify the file system and document structure through
links.relink(asset replacement),transform.resize(layout changes),file.exportPdf(file creation), andfile.package(file collection). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the properties extracted from external documents before they are passed as arguments to the execution commands.
Audit Metadata