designcraft-print-preflight

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local Python utility script (scripts/write_script.py) to resolve command templates and subsequently run the designcraft-cli binary to perform document modifications.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration (references/craft-command-evidence.json) references an external portable ZIP archive hosted on GitHub (github.com/storytold/designcraft) which contains the primary CLI tool used by the skill. Additionally, the instructions suggest installing a related skill via the npx skills add command.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from design documents and interpolating that data into file-system and layout modification commands.
  • Ingestion points: Document metadata, including asset IDs, text content, and layout boundaries, is extracted from user-provided files using the document.inspect, links.list, and font.list commands as defined in references/craft-steps.json.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the design document fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify the file system and document structure through links.relink (asset replacement), transform.resize (layout changes), file.exportPdf (file creation), and file.package (file collection).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the properties extracted from external documents before they are passed as arguments to the execution commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 04:46 PM