designcraft-use
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads an official DesignCraft CLI binary from the vendor's GitHub releases at runtime. This process is highly secured through the use of a hardcoded
runtime.lock.jsonfile that specifies the exact expected SHA256 hashes for both the archive and the executable. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The downloaded binary is executed to perform document design tasks. The risk of supply chain attacks is mitigated by strict cryptographic verification, a restricted whitelist of allowed subcommands in
cli.py, and URL validation that ensures downloads only originate from authorized vendor repositories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto manage the lifecycle of the design tools. The implementation follows defensive coding standards, such as preventing shell execution (noshell=True), using absolute paths where possible, and including resource limits (e.g., file size and entry count limits) to prevent denial-of-service scenarios. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill ingests external outlines and design materials, it is theoretically susceptible to indirect prompt injection. However, it implements a robust 'Receipt and Manifest' system in
command_gateway.py. This system hashes all inputs before execution and all outputs after execution, allowing the agent to detect if the design tool was manipulated into making unauthorized changes to the filesystem. - [SAFE]: The skill scripts demonstrate high-quality security hygiene, including ZipSlip protection during extraction, atomic file writing to prevent corrupted state, and explicit warnings against using
sudoor modifying system environment variables.
Audit Metadata