effectcraft-cli-setup

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binaries and AI model weights (such as Roto Brush and Face Tracking models) from external sources, including https://github.com/storytold/effectcraft. Although it employs SHA-256 integrity verification, the sources are not verified trusted organizations.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Through bootstrap.py and workflow.py, the skill automates the retrieval and execution of the EffectCraft CLI and its dependencies.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple entry points, such as script.run, run_script, and file.executeFile, allow for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code or project-embedded scripts within the application context. This presents a path for executing potentially malicious logic if provided with untrusted project data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Management scripts including launch.sh (macOS/Linux) and launch.ps1 (Windows) are used to execute shell commands for environment setup and tool orchestration.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its handling of external data.
  • Ingestion points: It processes structured data from JSON workflow plans (e.g., brand-intro.json) and binary project files (.ecproj).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or guidance to ignore natural language instructions that might be embedded within these data formats.
  • Capability inventory: The environment includes high-privilege capabilities such as arbitrary script execution, file system operations, and network access for downloads.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on schema structure validation, which does not effectively filter for malicious natural language directives hidden in data fields.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 01:30 PM