effectcraft-motion-export
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The file
references/craft-command-evidence.jsonspecifies a download URL for a portable ZIP archive (https://github.com/storytold/effectcraft/releases/download/v0.10.0/effectcraft-0.10.0-windows-x64-portable.zip) containing theeffectcraft-cli.exebinary. This source is not associated with a pre-verified trusted organization.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions inSKILL.mdandreferences/craft-methods.mddirect the agent to execute theeffectcraft-clibinary with specific parameters to perform rendering and project manipulation. Running unvetted external binaries presents a high security risk as the code's behavior cannot be audited by the platform.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied project files (.ecproj) and media assets, which serves as a vulnerability surface for malicious data to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Project files and media assets referenced during the export process.
- Boundary markers: Absent. No specific instructions are provided to the agent to treat data inside the project files as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via the
effectcraft-clitool. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation or sanitization for content extracted from external project files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata