effectcraft-motion-export

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The file references/craft-command-evidence.json specifies a download URL for a portable ZIP archive (https://github.com/storytold/effectcraft/releases/download/v0.10.0/effectcraft-0.10.0-windows-x64-portable.zip) containing the effectcraft-cli.exe binary. This source is not associated with a pre-verified trusted organization.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/craft-methods.md direct the agent to execute the effectcraft-cli binary with specific parameters to perform rendering and project manipulation. Running unvetted external binaries presents a high security risk as the code's behavior cannot be audited by the platform.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied project files (.ecproj) and media assets, which serves as a vulnerability surface for malicious data to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Project files and media assets referenced during the export process.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No specific instructions are provided to the agent to treat data inside the project files as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via the effectcraft-cli tool.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of validation or sanitization for content extracted from external project files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 09:36 AM