effectcraft-use
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup process involves automated downloads of binary EffectCraft CLI artifacts and AI tracking models (face and roto models) using system tools like
curl. These resources are fetched from an unverified third-party repository (github.com/storytold/effectcraft) and vendor-owned accounts not included in the trusted provider list. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a
bootstrap.pyscript to download, verify, and initialize native binary executables on the host machine. This mechanism executes externally sourced binary code as a prerequisite for skill operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a high-risk
file.executeFilecommand that allows the agent to execute arbitrary files on the local system. It also relies on shell and PowerShell scripts (launch.sh,launch.ps1) for environment management and engine orchestration. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes multiple interfaces for dynamic code execution, including
script.runfor executing arbitrary JavaScript code andfile.runScriptfor processing external script files or batch command lists. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from project files and media (via
file.importandopen_projectinreferences/commands.json) and lacks sanitization or boundary markers when processing this data in conjunction with high-privilege capabilities like JavaScript execution (script.runinreferences/commands.json).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata