filmcraft-product-video
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The file
references/craft-command-evidence.jsonspecifies a remote download for a portable Windows executable:https://github.com/storytold/filmcraft/releases/download/v0.8.0/filmcraft-0.8.0-windows-x64-portable.zip. This binary is used as the primary tool for the skill's operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed instructions for executing the downloaded
filmcraft-cli.exethrough the shell. The execution pattern includes passing project files and generated command lists:filmcraft-cli --project input.fcproj --save-as output.fcproj run steps.jsonl. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted media assets from the user.
- Ingestion points: Media files are imported using the
file.importmethod with user-provided paths. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate user-provided content from the command logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform file system operations (read/write) and execute shell commands via the CLI tool.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to ensure that imported media or its metadata does not influence the command execution flow.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions involve creating a JSONL file (
steps.jsonl) at runtime which contains a sequence of commands to be processed and executed by thefilmcraft-clitool. This is a form of dynamic code generation and execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata