filmcraft-short-video
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a download for a portable binary executable from an external GitHub repository not identified as a trusted vendor. Evidence:
references/craft-command-evidence.jsonspecifies a download URL forfilmcraft-0.8.0-windows-x64-portable.zipfrom thestorytold/filmcraftrepository. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to download and subsequently execute an external binary tool, which is a high-risk pattern. Evidence: The
runtimeobject inreferences/craft-command-evidence.jsonprovides the source URL and the executable name (filmcraft-cli.exe) for local execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed instructions and examples for the agent to execute a CLI tool with generated parameters. Evidence:
references/craft-methods.mdandreferences/craft-steps.jsonoutline the usage offilmcraft-cli.exeto process project operations defined in JSONL format. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external video media content, creating a vulnerability surface where embedded data (such as metadata or transcriptions) could influence the agent's logic. 1. Ingestion points: The
file.importcommand inreferences/craft-steps.jsonis used to load external video files. 2. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to ensure the agent ignores instructions embedded within the imported media. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute CLI commands, read/write files, and import external media. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of data extracted from imported media files is described in the provided instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata