zhipu-humanoid
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-provided text through the
messagesarray and transmits it to an external API. - Ingestion points: The
messagesparameter in the Python code examples withinSKILL.mdcaptures user input. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured role-based dictionaries (e.g., system, user) to separate instructions from user content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
zailibrary to perform network POST requests tohttps://open.bigmodel.cn. - Sanitization: No explicit input validation or sanitization is demonstrated for the user content passed into the model.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation identifies a specific local configuration path,
~/.glm/.env, for storing theZHIPU_API_KEY. While identifying storage locations is part of setup, it highlights a file path containing sensitive credentials. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references code examples that import the
zaiPython package, which is not the official Zhipu AI SDK (zhipuai). It also points to documentation and API endpoints hosted atgithub.com/tencentjerry-afk/zhipu-claude-skillsandopen.bigmodel.cn.
Audit Metadata