autoresearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies several ingestion points for untrusted data which could be used for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
improve.mdsubcommand ingests untrusted data fromWebSearchresults to generate insights and PRDs. Additionally,learn.md,security.md, andregression.mdingest content from the project codebase (source files, manifests, and git history) which could be controlled by an external attacker in shared environments. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define unique delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data during interpolation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has powerful capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands (
Verify,Guard,Target), perform file operations viagit(revert, commit, worktree), and perform network operations viaWebSearch. - Sanitization: The skill includes robust sanitization for specific risks, such as a multi-layered secret scrubber in
learn.md(post-generationgrepfor keys and tokens) and a command safety screen inplan.mdandautoresearch.md. However, it lacks generic sanitization against prompt-based instruction overrides in untrusted inputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core loop relies on the execution of shell commands provided by the user or derived by the agent.
- Evidence: The protocols in
autoresearch.md,fix.md,regression.md, andplan.mdrequire the execution ofVerify,Target, andGuardcommands to measure project metrics and ensure code stability. - Mitigation: The skill implements a 'Verify Safety Screen' before executing derived commands, which checks for dangerous patterns including
rm -rf, fork bombs,curl|shpipes, embedded credentials, and unauthorized outbound writes.
Audit Metadata