openspec-apply-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted data from external project files and CLI outputs.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
contextandoperationGuidancefields from the JSON output ofopenspec instructions apply. It also reads multiple file paths listed incontextFiles. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit behavioral boundaries, directing the agent to 'Keep both fields separate from CLI-returned state', 'preserve the controlling value' in case of conflicts, and stating that these inputs 'do not permit bypassing a blocked state'.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute
openspecCLI commands via Bash, read arbitrary local files within the project context, and modify files (specifically marking tasks as complete). - Sanitization: The skill implements a priority system where built-in instructions and CLI-controlled states override external guidance. It also explicitly forbids copying runtime context or guidance into implementation files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bash(openspec:*)tool to interact with the local system. - Evidence: The skill executes commands like
openspec status,openspec list, andopenspec instructionsusing arguments derived from user input (--change "<name>",--store "<id>"). While the instructions use double-quotes to suggest parameter encapsulation, the processing of user-provided strings in shell commands remains a standard vulnerability surface.
Audit Metadata