openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external context and operation guidance from the local environment, which could be manipulated by an attacker to include malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
openspec instructions archive,openspec instructions specs, and thetasks.mdfile in the SKILL.md (Steps 1, 3, and 4). - Boundary markers: The skill includes explicit instructions to treat external data as advisory and forbids it from overriding core workflow steps or command contracts. It also requires the agent to report conflicts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands for filesystem management (
mkdir,mv) and invoke theopenspecCLI tool. - Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language boundary logic rather than programmatic escaping or validation of the fetched instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to archive files and interact with the OpenSpec CLI.
- Evidence: Use of
mkdir -pandmvto manage the archive directory structure in Step 5. - Evidence: Multiple sub-process calls to the
openspecCLI (e.g.,status,list,instructions) with parameters derived from user input or context.
Audit Metadata