baoyu-youtube-transcript
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes external tools like
yt-dlp,uvx, orpython3viaspawnSyncto retrieve video information and subtitles. - Uses the
--remote-components ejs:githubflag, enablingyt-dlpto fetch and execute extractor updates from GitHub. - Supports the
YOUTUBE_TRANSCRIPT_COOKIES_FROM_BROWSERenvironment variable, allowing the tool to access host browser cookies. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Permits writing files to arbitrary system locations using the
--outputand--output-dirarguments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Retrieves data from YouTube and Google APIs and downloads images from
i.ytimg.com. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Uses
uvxto dynamically download and execute theyt-dlppackage if it is not locally available. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it feeds untrusted video metadata and transcript text into an AI sub-agent for speaker identification.
- Ingestion points: Video title, description, and raw transcript content from
meta.jsonandtranscript-raw.jsonare processed by an AI sub-agent. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
prompts/speaker-transcript.mddoes not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to protect the sub-agent from malicious commands embedded in the data. - Capability inventory: The sub-agent is instructed to read the transcript file and overwrite it with the processed version.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the untrusted YouTube content before it is interpolated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata