openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-provided change names/descriptions (Step 1) and JSON data retrieved via
openspec instructions(Step 5a), specifically theinstruction,context,rules, andtemplatefields. - Boundary markers: The skill contains a 'Planning boundary' section that explicitly instructs the agent to stop after generating planning artifacts and not to modify project code or start implementation.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute
openspecCLI commands via Bash and write files to the local filesystem (Step 3, Step 5a). - Sanitization: The skill does not describe explicit sanitization or validation of the input strings before they are used in CLI commands or output as files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using variables derived from user input.
- Evidence: The agent uses user-provided names to execute
openspec new change "<name>"andopenspec status --change "<name>"inSKILL.md(Step 3 and Step 4). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow allows the execution logic to be dynamically changed by external tool output.
- Evidence: Step 5a in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to "invoke it [a specific skill or command] to produce the artifact" if theinstructionfield from the CLI tool delegates creation, rather than following a static file-writing procedure.
Audit Metadata