openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches external instructions using
openspec instructions archiveandopenspec instructions specs. These instructions, includingcontext,operationGuidance, andrules, are explicitly incorporated into the agent's reasoning process. If these are sourced from untrusted changes, they could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the archiving or syncing process. - Ingestion points: Output from the
openspec instructions archive(Step 1) andopenspec instructions specs(Step 4) tools. - Boundary markers: The skill provides logical instructions to handle conflicts (e.g., 'If context conflicts... report the conflict') and warns against verbatim copying, but does not specify technical delimiters to isolate this untrusted content from the primary prompt.
- Capability inventory: Access to
bashfor executingopenspec,mkdir, andmvcommands, as well as file system read access fortasks.mdand specification files. - Sanitization: The skill mandates the agent to perform a conflict analysis between external guidance and built-in rules, rejecting guidance that contradicts controlling inputs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands (
mkdir,mv) to manage the archive directory. These operations depend on variables such asplanningHome.changesDirandchangeRootwhich are derived from the output of theopenspec statustool. While these are standard operations for archiving, they represent a capability to modify the filesystem structure based on dynamic tool output.
Audit Metadata