ddd4j-boot-observability
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves reading and analyzing external project files, which constitutes a potential injection vector if those files contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read Maven
pom.xmlfiles, source code, and integration test results inSKILL.mdandreferences/workflow.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the analyzed project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for deep filesystem access within the workspace and can generate configuration changes based on analyzed data.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping mechanisms for external content are defined in the instructions.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The reference documentation contains a hardcoded absolute local path which exposes author-specific metadata.
- Evidence: The file
references/source-evidence.mdspecifies a root directory of/Users/wandl/workspaces/workspace-ddd4j/workspace-ddd4j-boot/ddd4j-boot. This discloses the author's local username and directory structure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation suggests using
npxto install related tools, which involves downloading and executing code. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains suggestions to runnpx skills add full-stack-skills/ddd4j-skills --skill [name]. - Context: These resources originate from the skill's own vendor, 'full-stack-skills', and are part of the standard installation workflow.
Audit Metadata