openspec-propose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions require the agent to invoke specific skills or commands if the
instructionfield in the JSON output fromopenspec instructionsdelegates the creation of an artifact. This creates a mechanism where the external CLI tool can dictate executable actions for the agent at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes multiple external data sources, including JSON from the
openspecCLI and existing artifact files from the disk (dependencies). These sources provide an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content could override the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Output from
openspec instructionsand content of dependency files read from the disk in Step 5a. - Boundary markers: The skill contains internal reminders to use
contextandrulesas constraints without copying them, but it lacks explicit technical delimiters to separate external data from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands within the
openspecnamespace and write files to the local filesystem atresolvedOutputPath. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the
instruction,template, or dependency content is mentioned before it is processed or used to generate new files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
openspecCLI for various operations. Commands are constructed using parameters like<name>,<store-id>, and<artifact-id>which originate from user input or external JSON. This presents a potential command argument injection surface if the parameters are not safely handled by the platform or the CLI tool itself.
Audit Metadata