docker-ai-ml
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for system-level configuration, including using
sudoto install packages and restart the Docker daemon inreferences/01-gpu-setup.md. It also documents thedocker agentfeature inSKILL.md, which utilizes anexecute_commandtool for executing tasks within isolated sandbox environments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/01-gpu-setup.mdfile contains instructions to download repository keys and configuration files from NVIDIA's official GitHub-hosted service (nvidia.github.io). This is a standard and necessary step for enabling hardware acceleration and originates from a well-known technology provider. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The Docker Agent configuration described in
SKILL.mdrepresents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it facilitates the processing of user-provided goals using high-capability tools. - Ingestion points: Untrusted instructions enter the agent context via the command-line interface as illustrated in
SKILL.md(e.g.,docker agent run -f agent.yaml "Fix the bug..."). - Boundary markers: The example
agent.yamlprovided inSKILL.mddoes not specify delimiters or security instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in files it may read. - Capability inventory: According to
SKILL.md, the agent is configured with powerful capabilities includingexecute_commandandwrite_file. - Sanitization: No input sanitization, filtering, or validation logic is documented within the skill's instructions or example configurations.
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