docker-build
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples in
SKILL.mdandreferences/01-build-command-reference.mdof using subshell expansion to pass build arguments from a file:docker build --build-arg $(cat .env.build | xargs). This pattern can be exploited for arbitrary command execution on the host system if the.env.buildfile content is untrusted.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions for building images directly from remote Git repositories (e.g.,https://github.com/user/repo.git#main). This involves fetching and potentially executing code from external sources during the build process.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via processed Dockerfiles and build contexts.\n - Ingestion points: Local files, stdin, and remote Git repositories (found in
SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: None identified. No delimiters or instructions are used to isolate untrusted content.\n
- Capability inventory:
docker build(local command execution),docker push(network access), and image management commands.\n - Sanitization: No input validation or instruction filtering for external content is present.
Audit Metadata