openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and acting upon external, potentially untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The skill executes
openspec instructions archiveto retrievecontextandoperationGuidance, andopenspec instructions specsto retrieve mergerules. It also parsestasks.mdand the output ofopenspec status --json. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit guardrails, such as 'Keep both fields separate from built-in steps', 'do not copy their text verbatim', and 'report the conflict and preserve the controlling value'. These markers are intended to prevent the agent from being fully overridden by the external instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (via the
openspectool), create directories (mkdir), move directories (mv), and perform an 'agent-driven intelligent merge' of specification files. - Sanitization: While the skill instructs the agent to 'read and consider' inputs without copying them verbatim, the agent still integrates this external logic into its operational workflow, which can be exploited if the external source is compromised.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands to interact with the filesystem and the
openspecCLI. - The skill uses
mkdir -pto create archive directories andmvto relocate the change root directory. - It heavily relies on the
openspectool for operations likelist,status,instructions, andarchive.
Audit Metadata