esp32-wifi-provision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
idf.pycommands for environment checking (--version,list-targets) and dependency management (add-dependency). These are standard development operations for the ESP-IDF ecosystem and do not represent a security risk. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches components from the official Espressif Component Registry (
components.espressif.com). This is a well-known and trusted service for ESP32 development, and its use is documented neutrally as part of the standard workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a process for receiving Wi-Fi credentials from external sources, creating a potential data ingestion surface.
- Ingestion points: Wi-Fi SSID and password data are received from mobile applications via SoftAP or BLE transports, as defined in the state machine within
examples/ge-wifi-provision/ge-provision-state.json. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on the structured
protocommprotocol, which provides inherent framing for data handling. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to write credentials to NVS flash memory (
nvs_flash_init) and initiate Wi-Fi connections. No dangerous capabilities like shell command execution or arbitrary file modification based on this ingested data were identified. - Sanitization: Input validation and sanitization are performed by the underlying ESP-IDF
network_provisioningcomponent libraries. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
examples/ge-wifi-provision/ge-provision-config.ccontains a hardcoded password string (tinynas-2026) used for the Proof of Possession (PoP) security feature. This is part of a "Golden Example" clearly intended for verification purposes only. The skill's primary instructions inSKILL.mdandreferences/security-scheme.mdexplicitly warn against hardcoding credentials in production source code.
Audit Metadata