openspec-propose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in Step 5a explicitly tell the agent to "invoke" a specific skill or command if directed by the
instructionfield retrieved from theopenspecCLI tool. This allows for runtime command generation and execution based on data returned by an external process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes data from multiple external sources. 1. Ingestion points: Reads instructions, templates, and path information from the
openspecCLI tool output in SKILL.md (Step 4 and 5), reads content from existing project files (dependencies) in Step 5a, and accepts user-provided change names and descriptions. 2. Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters when processing data from the CLI or local files. 3. Capability inventory: The skill uses theBashtool to executeopenspeccommands and performs file system operations (read/write) atresolvedOutputPath. 4. Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating theinstructionortemplatestrings received from the CLI before they are used to guide agent behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to interact with theopenspecCLI, performing actions such as listing stores, creating changes, and querying status, which involves executing system-level commands.
Audit Metadata