openspec-propose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands through the
openspecCLI (e.g.,openspec new change,openspec status,openspec instructions) to perform its primary function. While theallowed-toolsconfiguration attempts to restrict this to theopenspecnamespace, command execution remains a core capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from external sources, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes output from
openspec instructions <artifact-id> --jsonand re-reads artifact files (likeproposal.mdorspecs/) from the local disk. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit directives to treat certain blocks (like
<context>and<rules>) as internal constraints rather than content for output, which serves as a basic boundary but does not prevent adversarial injection. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files to the local file system (
resolvedOutputPath) and execute CLI commands via Bash. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested instructions or file content is performed before the agent uses them to generate new artifacts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow contains logic in Step 5a that instructs the agent to dynamically invoke a specific command or skill if directed by the
instructionfield within the JSON output ofopenspec instructions. Executing commands determined at runtime by external data is a significant security risk.
Audit Metadata