openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and follow instructions from external sources at runtime, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In Step 1, the skill runs
openspec instructions archive --change "<name>" --jsonand in Step 4, it runsopenspec instructions specs --change "<name>" --jsonto fetch external data. - Boundary markers: The skill contains weak boundaries, instructing the agent to 'Treat context as a required prompt-level input' and 'apply relevant project facts, conventions, and constraints,' while only suggesting reporting conflicts rather than strictly isolating the data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash(openspec:*)tools, which include capabilities to write specs, archive changes, and perform file system operations likemkdirandmv. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content returned by the CLI commands before it is adopted as behavior-modifying guidance.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-level operations, including directory creation (
mkdir) and moving files (mv), as well as executing various subcommands of theopenspecCLI. These operations are within the stated scope of the skill's purpose (archiving changes).
Audit Metadata