openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface where it ingests untrusted data from both tool outputs and local files to determine its subsequent actions. If an attacker can influence the output of the
openspectool or the content of project files, they might be able to redirect the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The skill reads JSON output from
openspec instructionsandopenspec status, and it re-reads dependency files from the local disk. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit warnings for the agent to treat certain fields (
contextandrules) as constraints and not to include them in the generated output files, which serves as a basic delimiter against accidental obedience. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files to disk (
resolvedOutputPath), execute theopenspecCLI tool, and potentially invoke other skills or commands as directed by theinstructionfield from the tool's output. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation logic described for the content retrieved from the CLI tool or the local files before it is used to generate new artifacts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes the
openspecCLI tool via Bash. While these commands are generally scoped, they use arguments such as change names, schema names, and store IDs which are derived from user input or project context, presenting a standard command interpolation surface.
Audit Metadata