openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
openspecCLI for state management and metadata retrieval. The execution environment is restricted via theallowed-toolsconfiguration to theopenspeccommand namespace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-provided descriptions, JSON output from
openspecCLI commands, and existing artifact files (dependencies) read from the filesystem. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing external content.
- Capability inventory: Access to
Bash(scoped toopenspec:*) and the ability to write files to the local directory. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation is performed on the data ingested from dependencies or CLI outputs before it is used for artifact creation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains logic to execute commands or skills dynamically if specified in the
instructionfield of the CLI's output. Although this is a functional requirement for flexible workflows, it introduces a path for dynamic command invocation, which is partially mitigated by the platform-level tool restrictions.
Audit Metadata