pencil
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
batch_designtool accepts a domain-specific "operation script" (DSL) as a string argument. This involves the agent generating and executing a sequence of commands at runtime to perform complex design modifications, creating a dynamic execution surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading data from external
.penfiles while maintaining powerful write capabilities. Maliciously crafted design files could potentially influence agent behavior when processed through reading tools. - Ingestion points:
batch_get,snapshot_layout,get_variables, andget_editor_state(when reading document content). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the design data.
- Capability inventory:
batch_design(scripted design changes),set_variables(metadata modification),replace_all_matching_properties(bulk attribute updates), andopen_document(file system interaction). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or escaping content retrieved from design files before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided MCP configuration example includes a hardcoded absolute path to a binary in a specific user's directory (
/Users/wandl/...). This practice is brittle and poses a risk if the environment is not controlled or if the path points to an untrusted executable.
Audit Metadata