openspec-propose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow where the agent parses instructions from an external command's output (
openspec instructions) to determine how to proceed. Specifically, step 5.a directs the agent that if theinstructionfield delegates creation to a "specific skill or command," it should "invoke it to produce the artifact." This represents the dynamic execution of commands determined at runtime from external data sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon instructions, context, and rules provided in JSON format by the
openspecCLI. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested through
openspec instructions <artifact-id> --change "<name>" --jsonandopenspec status --change "<name>" --jsoninSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill includes instructions to treat
contextandrulesblocks as constraints and specifically not to copy them into the output files, which serves as a basic delimiter for the agent. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
Bashtool and write files to the local file system. - Sanitization: The skill instructs the agent to derive a kebab-case name from user input and to re-read dependencies from disk, but lacks formal sanitization of the structured data returned by the CLI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes shell command execution with multiple interpolated variables, including
<name>,<store-id>,<schema-name>, and<artifact-id>. While the instructions include guidance on formatting (e.g., kebab-case for the name), the direct interpolation of these variables into bash commands presents a potential risk for command injection if the underlying agent does not properly escape the inputs before execution.
Audit Metadata