openspec-apply-change

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from the openspec CLI outputs, specifically the context and operationGuidance fields returned by the instructions command. This represents a tool-output poisoning surface where external data is treated as prompt-level input.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Steps 2, 3, and 4) ingests data from openspec status, openspec instructions, and the content of files identified in contextFiles.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. While the skill instructs the agent to keep external guidance separate from system instructions and to report conflicts, no formal character-based delimiters (e.g., XML tags) are specified for the parsing of the CLI output.
  • Capability inventory: SKILL.md (Step 6) performs file system writes to implement code changes, and the skill is authorized to use the Bash(openspec:*) tool.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not mandate specific sanitization of the CLI output before interpolation into the prompt.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the openspec CLI tool via Bash. While the tool usage is restricted to the openspec namespace in allowed-tools, the command arguments are dynamically constructed based on user input and previous CLI outputs, which is a standard functional requirement for this skill type.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 07:51 AM