openspec-apply-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from the
openspecCLI outputs, specifically thecontextandoperationGuidancefields returned by theinstructionscommand. This represents a tool-output poisoning surface where external data is treated as prompt-level input. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Steps 2, 3, and 4) ingests data fromopenspec status,openspec instructions, and the content of files identified incontextFiles. - Boundary markers: Absent. While the skill instructs the agent to keep external guidance separate from system instructions and to report conflicts, no formal character-based delimiters (e.g., XML tags) are specified for the parsing of the CLI output.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(Step 6) performs file system writes to implement code changes, and the skill is authorized to use theBash(openspec:*)tool. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not mandate specific sanitization of the CLI output before interpolation into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
openspecCLI tool viaBash. While the tool usage is restricted to theopenspecnamespace inallowed-tools, the command arguments are dynamically constructed based on user input and previous CLI outputs, which is a standard functional requirement for this skill type.
Audit Metadata