tui-prd-to-descriptions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing external data to generate instructions for other agents.
- Ingestion points: Processes user-provided PRD documents, interface descriptions, and functional requirements (defined in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the input PRD text to prevent it from influencing the output prompts.
- Capability inventory: While this skill does not directly invoke tools (confirmed by its documentation), it generates high-privilege plans (
PENCIL_PLAN) containing tool calls such asmcp__pencil__batch_designfor downstream consumption bypencil-skillsor other agents. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the input content is performed before it is interpolated into the generated
STITCH_PROMPTorPENCIL_PLANoutputs.
Audit Metadata