openspec-apply-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data that could contain instructions designed to subvert the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files identified in the
contextFilesarray (Step 4) and interprets natural language fields likecontextandoperationGuidancereturned by theopenspec instructions applycommand (Step 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions include conceptual boundaries (e.g., "Treat context as a required prompt-level input", "report the conflict") but no physical markers or sanitization are applied to the external data before it is read into the context.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to modify local files (Step 6) and execute a variety of
openspecCLI commands via theBashtool. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the content of the context files or the guidance fields provided by the external project.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bash(openspec:*)tool to execute CLI commands. While the tool is scoped to theopenspecnamespace, it processes user-provided change names and store IDs as arguments (e.g.,openspec status --change "<name>" --store "<id>"). Although the instructions use double quotes for these variables, there is a potential for command injection if the underlying platform does not properly sanitize these inputs.
Audit Metadata