openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch and adopt behavioral guidance from external command outputs (
openspec instructions archiveandopenspec instructions specs).\n - Ingestion points: Identified in
SKILL.md(Steps 1 and 4), where the agent runs CLI commands to retrieve JSON payloads containingcontext,operationGuidance, andrulesfrom the local environment.\n - Boundary markers: The skill attempts to define boundaries by stating these inputs are "advisory" and should not override "controlling inputs," yet it also explicitly labels
contextas a "required prompt-level input" andrulesas constraints on spec writing.\n - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute
Bashcommands, read project files (liketasks.md), and write to the filesystem via the spec synchronization process.\n - Sanitization: There is no automated validation or sanitization of the externally provided instructions; the skill relies on the agent's ability to identify conflicts manually.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the
Bashtool to interact with theopenspecCLI and standard filesystem utilities.\n - Evidence: Execution of
openspec status,openspec list,mkdir -p, andmvcommands to manage project state and archive change directories.
Audit Metadata